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I. INTRODUCTION
The history of wills tells us that a will is an instrument which is
not immediately operative but is revocable before the testator dies.1
More importantly, a will carries out a person's intent after his or her
death.2 The requirements for a valid will have changed over the years
and have traditionally included a great deal of formalism before a
court would give a will effect. Recently, courts have been requiring
less formalism, and when interpreting wills, they are giving more at-
tention to what the testator truly intended. The Uniform Probate
Code, which Nebraska has adopted, recognizes holographic wills as
valid testamentary instruments.3 Holographic wills in general are
those that are written, dated, and signed in the handwriting of the
testator.4 The extent of the writing that must be in the testator's
handwriting differs from state to state, as do ideas about the amount
of extrinsic evidence that can be looked at to determine testator in-
tent. Nebraska has explored the limits of evidence it will consider as
well as the extent of the writing required to be in the handwriting of
the testator in Estate of Foxley v. Hogan.5
In Foxley, the Nebraska Supreme Court determined that the testa-
tor's changes to her attested will were not sufficient to create a valid
holographic instrument. In editing the will, the testator crossed out
one daughter's name, Jane F. Jones, and wrote the following interline-
ation: "her share to be divided to between [sic] 5 daughters E.F. 1-3-
94."6 She also crossed out the word "six" as follows: "to my (6) daugh-
ters in equal shares" and wrote in the number "5" below it.7
At trial, there was evidence that Ms. Foxley had planned to make a
change to her will because her daughter, Ms. Jones, had predeceased
her. Under Ms. Foxley's original will, Ms. Jones' share of the estate
would have gone to Ms. Jones' son, Hogan, and evidence was intro-
duced showing Ms. Foxley disliked Hogan.8 Ms. Foxley told her attor-
1. See THox As E. ATKmNSON, LAW OF WiLLs 2 (2d ed. 1953).
2. See id.
3. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (1969). Nebraska adopted § 2-503 of the Uni-
form Probate Code in 1974 Neb. Laws 354 (codified as NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-2328
(Reissue 1995)).
4. See ATKINSON, supra note 1, at 355.
5. 254 Neb. 204, 575 N.W.2d 150 (1998).
6. Foxley, 254 Neb. at 205, 575 N.W.2d at 152.
7. Id. at 206, 575 N.W.2d at 152.
8. See id.
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ney and one of her daughters that she did not want Hogan
participating in her estate but told her attorney that she would "take
care of it."9
The court's holding in this case unwisely excluded evidence of tes-
tator intent. Although Ms. Foxley clearly did not disregard her at-
tested will when she altered it, the court, in its analysis, read only the
handwritten words, ignoring the printed words. The effect of this deci-
sion on those who attempt to create something of a holographic nature
will be to strike down the testamentary instrument unless the lan-
guage in the handwriting of the testator, standing alone, shows testa-
mentary intent. Under the Nebraska Supreme Court's rule as seen in
Foxey, a testamentary instrument could be struck down even though
testamentary intent is clear from examining the other printed words
and looking to evidence of the circumstances surrounding the testator
at the time the attested will was edited.
II. BACKGROUND
One of the underlying purposes of the Nebraska Probate Code is
"to discover and make effective the intent of a decedent."io To reach
that end, the "code shall be liberally construed and applied"11 and, as
a general rule, the circumstances surrounding the testator at the time
the instrument was created may be considered by the court in finding
intent.12
A. Holographic Wills and Codicils
In Nebraska, when a person writes, dates, and signs a will in his or
her own handwriting, the instrument is accepted as a valid will even
though there are no witnesses as normally required for a will to be
valid.13 This type of testamentary instrument is referred to as a ho-
lographic will.1 4 The policy behind accepting holographs is to allow
people to write wills themselves if they can not obtain legal assist-
ance.1 5 Holographs are important when the testator can not afford to
execute an attested will or if the person does not have time to have one
drawn up with the traditional, formal requirement of two witnesses.16
9. See id.
10. NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-2202 (Reissue 1995).
11. Id.
12. See ATKISON, supra note 1, at 810.
13. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2328 (Reissue 1995).
14. See id.
15. See, e.g., UNri. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 cmt. (1969).
16. See id; see also Kevin R. Natale, Note, A Survey, Analysis, and Evaluation of
Holographic Will Statutes, 17 HOFSTRA L. REv. 159, 160 (1988) (noting that ho-
lographic wills are for the convenience of the testator and enable those unable to
obtain legal assistance to make a valid will in their own handwriting).
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It is clearly better to allow a person to write a will by hand than to
allow that person to die intestate. Because the holographic will stat-
ute relaxes the traditional formality requirements, the code allows
more instruments to be accepted as valid wills.
Holographic wills are recognized in over half the states but to vary-
ing degrees in each state. 17 In the most conservative holographic will
states, the requirements include that the instrument be entirely writ-
ten, dated, and signed in the handwriting of the testator, and those
states will not consider anything printed or typed as part of the will.' 8
Nebraska, on the other hand, has followed the less formalistic require-
ments of the original Uniform Probate Code.19
The Nebraska holographic will statute states that an instrument
"is valid as a holographic will, whether or not witnessed, if the signa-
ture, the material provisions, and an indication of the date of signing
are in the handwriting of the testator."2 0 Applying this statute, the
Nebraska Supreme Court determined in Cummings v. Curtiss2 1 that a
holographic will is valid if the intent of the testator can be determined
from the handwritten portions of the instrument.2 2 In reaching its
decision, the court relied on case law from other states interpreting
statutes similar to Nebraska's. The court came to the conclusion that
all language, except for that in the testator's handwriting, is to be dis-
regarded in determining testator intent when on a printed will form. 23
Nebraska's position has been that a will could be handwritten on a
printed will form so long as the handwritten portions, standing alone,
clearly express testamentary intent.24 However, Arizona, one of the
states Nebraska relied upon for this rule, went further to say that
"[s]uch handwritten provisions may draw testamentary context from
both the printed and the handwritten language" on a printed will
form.2 5
Under the Nebraska Probate Code, a will is defined as "any instru-
ment, including a codicil or other testamentary instrument complying
with [the sections of this Code], which.., revokes or revises an earlier
17. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 3.2 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1998).
18. See id.
19. Nebraska adopted this portion of the Uniform Probate Code in 1974 Neb. Laws
354 (codified as NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-2328 (Reissue 1995)).
20. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2328 (Reissue 1995).
21. 219 Neb. 106, 361 N.W.2d 508 (1985).
22. See id.
23. See id. at 109, 361 N.W.2d at 510 (1985). Nebraska followed the case law of other
states with similar statutes. See, e.g., Estate of Johnson v. Johnson, 630 P.2d
1039 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981); Succession of Burke, 365 So. 2d 858 (La. Ct. App.
1978); Watkins v. Boykin, 536 S.W.2d 400 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
24. See Cummings, 219 Neb. at 109, 361 N.W.2d at 510.
25. Estate of Muder v. Muder, 765 P.2d 997, 1000 (Ariz. 1988) (emphasis added).
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executed testamentary instrument."2 6 Black's Law Dictionary defines
a codicil as follows:
A supplement or an addition to a will; it may explain, modify, add to, subtract
from, qualify, alter, restrain or revoke provisions in existing will. Such does
not purport to dispose of entire estate or to contain the entire will of testator,
nor does it ordinarily expressly or by necessary implication revoke in toto a
prior will. 2 7
A tentative draft of the Restatement (Third) of Property states, "In
a jurisdiction that permits holographic wills, the testator may validly
make a handwritten alteration of a previously executed attested will if
he or she signs the alteration. . . The handwritten alteration is
treated as a holographic codicil."28
B. Construction vs. Interpretation of Wills
Courts interpret wills by examining the will itself as well as the
circumstances surrounding the testator at the time the instrument
was executed. 29 In order to discover the testator's probable meaning,
a court must put "itself into the testator's armchair so as to see what
he knew, liked, disliked and how he talked and wrote about the mat-
ters connected with his disposition."3o
Construction is the assignment of meaning to a testator's words
through specific rules. 3 1 These rules can be viewed as a set of pre-
sumptions about a person's will, such as the presumption against in-
testacy and the presumption in favor of the spouse and heirs.32
Construction of a will is done when testator intent can not be found
through interpretation.3 3 If a court goes into construction, it is not
trying to find intent anymore. Therefore, the court follows rules of
construction to find an acceptable resolution of the language where
intent was either absent during drafting or sufficient intent could not
be found through interpretation.S4
C. Nebraska's Position Regarding the Handwritten
Alteration of an Attested Will
In Estate of Foxley v. Hogan, Ms. Foxley executed a valid will
which provided that the majority of her estate be divided between her
26. NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-2209 (53) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
27. BLAcis LAW DICTIoNARY 258 (6th ed. 1990).
28. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 3.2 cmt. g (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1998).
29. See, e.g., ATmINSON, supra note 1, at 810.
30. Id.
31. See id. at 814.
32. See id.
33. See id. at 813.
34. See id.
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six daughters. 35 Subsequent to the execution of her will, one of the
daughters, Jane Jones, died and was survived by her only son, Ho-
gan.36 At trial, evidence was adduced that Ms. Foxley did not like
Hogan.37 After she discovered that Hogan was to receive his mother's
share of a trust that had previously been established, Ms. Foxley told
her attorney that "she wanted Hogan bought out" of the trust.3 8 She
also "emphatically 3 9 indicated to him that she did not want Hogan
participating in her estate and "that she would 'take care of it."40 The
attorney understood Ms. Foxley's statement to mean "butt out.., this
is my business."41 Another of Ms. Foxley's daughters testified that
Ms. Foxley explicitly stated her desire to exclude Hogan from partici-
pating in her estate and that she regretted overlooking the possibility
of one of her daughters predeceasing her when she established the
trust.
4 2
Upon Ms. Foxley's death, a folder containing the executed will and
a photocopy of the will were found in her den.43 The photocopy had
been altered on the first page as follows:
ARTICLE I
My only children are William C. Foxley, Sarah F. Gress, John
C. Foxley, Winifred F. Wells, Elizabeth F. Leach, Shiela F.
Radford; Mary Ann Pirotte and 'a: t. .
The third page had been changed as follows:
ARTICLE III
I hereby give, devise and bequeath all of the rest of my
proper to my.s.:., (6) daughters in equal shares.
The parties conceded that the changes, the signature, and the date of
the changes were all in Ms. Foxley's handwriting. 44
35. See Estate of Foxley v. Hogan, 254 Neb. 204, 205, 575 N.W.2d 150, 152 (1998).
36. See id.
37. See id. at 206, 575 N.W.2d at 152.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See id.
43. See id. at 205, 575 N.W.2d at 152.
44. See id. at 208, 575 N.W.2d at 153.
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The Nebraska Supreme Court held that the handwritten changes
made by Ms. Foxley did not "constitute a valid holographic codicil."45
In reaching this conclusion, the court indicated that the "holographic
words, standing alone, [did not] demonstrate a clear testamentary in-
tent 46 and "[w]ithout the requisite testamentary intent, Foxley's
handwritten words cannot be deemed material provisions."47
Conversely, the Nebraska Court of Appeals had found that Ms.
Foxley's changes constituted a valid holographic codicil in part be-
cause "[hier intentions were emphatically, unequivocally, and repeat-
edly demonstrated by her spoken words, her writings, and her
actions."48
The court of appeals observed that, with regard to a preprinted will
form, testamentary context might be drawn from the printed form and
the portions written in by the testator.49 The court saw the Foxley
case as distinguishable from a prior Nebraska case, Cummings v. Cur-
tis.50 In Cummings, the Nebraska Supreme Court stated that hand-
written words on a preprinted will form probably constituted an
invalid will because the handwritten portions read alone did not
clearly express testamentary intent.51 The distinction is that Ms.
Foxley had a validly executed will that was originally drafted by her
attorney, rather than a printed will form.52 The court of appeals
stated that "by crossing out 'Jane F. Jones' and writing 'her share to
be divided to between 5 daughters' on the photocopy, Foxley clearly
demonstrated a testamentary intent."5 It was clear to the court that
"'her share' is Jane F. Jones' share" and that the changes made by Ms.
Foxley importantly included the strike through of her daughter's
name.
54
Finally, the court of appeals observed that all of the "statutory
safeguards for preventing fraud have been complied with" and there
was no evidence of fraud in the case at hand.55 Also, "[a]n overly tech-
nical application of the holographic will statute to handwritten testa-
mentary dispositions, which generally are made by persons without
45. See id. at 212, 575 N.W.2d at 155.
46. Id. at 210, 575 N.W.2d at 155.
47. Id. at 211, 575 N.W.2d at 155.
48. Estate of Foxley v. Hogan, 6 Neb. App. 1, 13, 568 N.W.2d 912, 919 (1997), rev'd,
254 Neb. 204, 575 N.W.2d 150 (1998).
49. See id., 6 Neb. App. at 7, 568 N.W.2d at 916. ("We see no need to ignore the
preprinted words when the testator clearly did not." (quoting In re Estate of
Muder, 765 P.2d 997, 1000 (Ariz. 1988))).
50. 219 Neb. 106, 361 N.W.2d 508 (1985).
51. See Foxtey, 6 Neb. App. at 7, 568 N.W.2d at 916.
52. See Foxley, 6 Neb. App. at 8, 568 N.W.2d at 916 (citing Cummings v. Curtiss, 219
Neb. 106, 361 N.W.2d 508 (1985)).
53. Id. at 8, 568 N.W.2d at 917.
54. Id. at 10, 568 N.W.2d at 918.
55. Id- at 13, 568 N.W.2d at 919.
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legal training, would seriously limit the effectiveness of the legislative
decision to authorize holographic wills."56
III. ANALYSIS
Ms. Foxley's testamentary intent can easily be determined by ex-
amining both the handwritten alterations and the altered, attested
will in conjunction with the circumstances surrounding her at the
time she made the alterations. The Nebraska Legislature's require-
ment that the Nebraska Probate Code be liberally construed in order
to discover and make effective testator intent should have resulted in
Ms. Foxley's edited will being validated.
A. Altered Holographic Wills vs. Printed Will Forms
It seems more worthy to give effect to an attested will with changes
made to it rather a printed will form with the blanks filled in because
the words in the attested will were originally the testator's own. Con-
versely, a will form is mass produced and the testator adds to the pre-
printed words on the form by simply filling in the blanks.57 An at-
tested will, entirely from the testator, rather than partially, as on a
will form, is more indicative of what he or she intended because it was
wholly made to fit the testator's particular situation. It seems less
likely that this level of specificity would be present where the testator
merely filled in the blanks of a will form, and therefore, less indicative
of intent.
In Cummings v. Curtiss, the Nebraska Supreme Court considered
whether handwritten words on a printed will form could constitute a
valid holographic will.5 When determining whether there may have
been testamentary intent, the court looked to other states' interpreta-
tions of statutes similar to Nebraska's and considered only the hand-
written words, ignoring the printed words. 5 9
Arizona case law, which Nebraska relied upon in part in the Cum-
mings case, at one point followed the "ignore the printed word" line of
analysis as well.6 0 However, in a later case, Estate of Muder v.
Muder,6 1 the Arizona Supreme Court went further by looking at the
56. Id. (quoting Estate of Black v. Rombotis, 641 P.2d 754, 756 (Cal. 1982)).
57. The Nebraska Court of Appeals also recognized this distinction in the Foxley
case. See Estate of Foxley v. Hogan, 6 Neb. App. 1 at 8, 568 N.W.2d 912 at 917
(1997), rev'd, 254 Neb. 204, 575 N.W.2d 150 (1998).
58. See Cummings v. Curtiss, 219 Neb. 106, 361 N.W.2d 508 (1985). The court's
opinion on this matter was less than a holding because it was not required to hold
whether or not it actually was a holographic will. Cummings was a fraudulent
misrepresentation case where a client sued her attorney.
59. See id. at 109, 361 N.W.2d at 510.
60. See Estate of Johnson v. Johnson, 630 P.2d 1039 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981).
61. 765 P.2d 997 (Ariz. 1988)
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printed and handwritten words together in determining testamentary
intent.6 2 The court interpreted a statute almost identical to Ne-
braska's and held that, in enacting the statute, the Arizona Legisla-
ture "intended to allow printed portions of the will form to be
incorporated into the handwritten portion of the holographic will."63
The Arizona courts have not specifically ruled on facts like those in
Foxley where an attested will was altered. However, it seems that if
the Arizona Supreme Court has allowed handwritten words to be read
in conjunction with words on a printed will form, that court would be
even more likely to read handwritten words with those on an attested
will like that of Ms. Foxley's.
A tentative draft of the Restatement (Third) of Property recognizes
alterations to attested wills. 64 It states that "[in a jurisdiction that
permits holographic wills, the testator may validly make a handwrit-
ten alteration of a previously executed attested will .... The hand-
written alteration is treated as a holographic codicil."65 The
recognition of alterations of attested wills seems rational, especially
when the intent of the testator is as clear as that of Ms. Foxley.
B. The Nebraska Probate Code's Requirement that the
Material Provisions of a Holographic Will be in the
Handwriting of the Testator
In Foxley, the Nebraska Supreme Court seemed concerned with
the requirement that the material provisions be in the handwriting of
the testator under the holographic will statute.6 6 An argument can be
made for the Nebraska Supreme Court's strict interpretation of the
statute, that is, reading only the handwriting of the testator when de-
termining testator intent. In fact, this is the most common position of
the state courts that have ruled on the subject.6 7 One might say that
if the legislature intended to allow the reading of the handwritten as
well as the printed words, they would have explicitly stated it in the
statute.
An explicit codification by the legislature should not be necessary,
however, considering that it has already stated that the code "shall be
liberally construed" to "make effective the intent of the decedent."6 8 A
62. See Muder, 765 P.2d at 1000 ("We see no need to ignore the preprinted words
when the testator clearly did not.").
63. Id.
64. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WiLs AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 3.2 cmt. g (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1998).
65. Id.
66. See Estate of Foxley v. Hogan, 254 Neb. 204, 209, 575 N.W. 2d 150, 154 (1998).
67. See Estate of Johnson v. Johnson, 630 P.2d 1039 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981); Succession
of Burke, 365 So. 2d 858 (La. Ct. App. 1978); Watkins v. Boykin, 536 S.W.2d 400
(Tex. App. 1976). But see Estate of Muder v. Muder, 765 P.2d 997 (Ariz. 1988).
68. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2202 (Reissue 1995) (emphasis added).
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liberal construction of the material provision requirement would allow
courts to read the printed portion along with the handwritten changes
if it is clear that the testator did not ignore the printed portions. Ari-
zona has held that handwritten provisions on a printed will form can
draw testamentary context from the handwritten words in conjunc-
tion with the printed words 69 under a code system quite similar to
Nebraska's system.70 The Arizona Supreme Court stated that their
statute does not require the court to ignore the printed words when it
is clear that the testator did not ignore them.7 1
However, the Arizona Supreme Court did give a caveat to the rule
by stating that so long as the "protection afforded by requiring the
material provisions be in the testator's handwriting is present," look-
ing to the printed words is acceptable. 72 The court did not specify
what the "protection afforded"7 3 includes, but it most likely includes
the avoidance of fraud by potential beneficiaries taking advantage of
testators in vulnerable moments, and changes made right after a fight
with a potential beneficiary. 74 Ms. Foxley was protected from both of
these in her situation. First, she did not have any fights with Hogan
or anyone else of which we know just before she made the changes. In
fact, there is evidence that Ms. Foxley had a long standing dislike for
Hogan.75 Second, no one had the opportunity to take advantage of
Ms. Foxley because she insisted on taking care of the problem her-
self.76 However, the legislature may have had other protections in
mind for the testator when it enacted the requirement that the mate-
rial provisions be in the handwriting of the testator. In contemplating
what those protections may have been, it seems unlikely that Ms.
Foxley would have been unprotected in her situation. The alterations
to the will were completely her idea after she discovered Hogan would
become a beneficiary of a trust in the place of her deceased daugh-
69. See Muder, 765 P.2d at 1000. Nebraska has followed Arizona case law in the past
on similar holographic will issues. See Cummings v. Curtiss, 219 Neb. 106, 109,
361 N.W.2d 508, 510 (1985) ("[O]nly the portion of the will actually in the hand-
writing of the testator is to be considered." (citing Estate of Johnson v. Johnson,
630 P.2d 1039 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981))).
70. Compare NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-2328 (Reissue 1995), with Amiz. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 14-2503 (West 1995).
71. See Muder, 765 P.2d. at 1000.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See Estate of Foxley v. Hogan, 254 Neb. 204, 210, 575 N.W.2d 150, 155 (1998).
The Nebraska Supreme Court expressed its concerns about what would happen if
it were to read the handwritten words as well as the printed words that Ms.
Foxley had edited. It seems that these sorts of things were of the type the mate-
rial provisions requirement was intended to protect.
75. See id. at 206, 575 N.W.2d at 152.
76. See id.
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ter.77 Further, Ms. Foxley was the one who initiated the changes to
her will. She needed no prompting from her relatives or attorneys.78
C. The Nebraska Supreme Court's Requirement that Ms.
Foxley's Words Alone Must Establish Intent
Ms. Foxley's intent was clear from the alterations to her attested
will as well as from the circumstances surrounding her when she
made the changes. However, the Nebraska Supreme Court unwisely
excluded her edited words in holding that only Ms. Foxley's handwrit-
ing, standing alone, was to be considered to establish her testamen-
tary intent.V9 Obviously, the court would find it difficult to make
sense of her handwritten words standing alone when Ms. Foxley her-
self did not ignore the printed words while editing her will. Under
this test, it is quite challenging to find testamentary intent in any case
where someone has altered an attested will by hand.
When Ms. Foxley crossed out the name "Jane F. Jones" she clearly
did not ignore the document she was altering. As discussed earlier,
Arizona has allowed handwritten and printed portions of a will to be
read together to determine a testator's intent.SO The Arizona
Supreme Court stated that if the testator did not ignore the
preprinted words, the court would not ignore them either.81
In Foxley, the Nebraska Supreme Court indicated that "the ho-
lographic words, standing alone, [did not] demonstrate a clear testa-
mentary intent" and to weaken this rule through reading the printed
words with the handwritten words would "invite mischief or outright
fraud" by potential beneficiaries.8 2 The court questioned where it
would stop if the court were to "make an exception in this case to the
rule that holographic words, standing alone, have to demonstrate a
clear testamentary intent."8 3 The court's fear of looking to the printed
words seems unfounded if the "protection afforded by requiring the
material provisions be in the testator's handwriting is present."8 4 As
demonstrated, those protections were present in Ms. Foxley's case.8 5
It is possible that the Nebraska Supreme Court finds it easier to
make decisions in cases involving wills when the decision turns on a
formalistic requirement instead of determining the true intent of the
testator. Indeed, it is much easier to look solely at the handwritten
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See id. at 211, 575 N.W.2d at 155.
80. See supra text accompanying notes 70-73.
81. See Estate of Muder v. Muder, 765 P.2d 997, 1000 (Ariz. 1988).
82. Estate of Foxley v. Hogan, 254 Neb. 204, 210, 575 N.W.2d 150, 155 (1998).
83. Id.
84. Estate of Muder v. Muder, 765 P.2d at 1000.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 70-80.
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words and say they do not make sense standing alone than to try to
discover a person's true intent. The division between whether an in-
strument is valid or not is much clearer under the Nebraska Supreme
Court's current test.
However, the Nebraska Legislature has stated that one of the poli-
cies behind the probate code is to determine the intent of the dece-
dent.8 6 Therefore, it seems that the court's test does not fully comply
with what the legislature requires.
D. Ms. Foxley's Intent and the Circumstances Surrounding
Her at the Time She Altered Her Attested Will
If the court were to put "itself into the testator's armchair"8 7 in the
Foxley case, it would discover that Ms. Foxley's clear intent was to cut
Hogan out of her will. In fact, upon examination of all the evidence, it
would have been a surprise if Ms. Foxley had not altered her will in
some way after her daughter's death.
It seems logical that any time a person has named someone as a
beneficiary and that beneficiary predeceases the testator, the testator
may want to change his or her will. When one considers Ms. Foxley's
feelings for Hogan, the person who would be the beneficiary in her
daughter's place, it would have been surprising if she had not changed
her will. The evidence introduced at trial regarding (1) the statements
to her attorney and daughter about having Hogan "bought out" of a
trust she had established; (2) the statement that she did not want Ho-
gan participating in her estate and that she would "take care of it";
and (3) her dislike of Hogan,88 indicate Ms. Foxley's desire to not only
change her will, but to take care of it herself. These facts clearly indi-
cate that Ms. Foxley wanted to change her will specifically to exclude
Hogan from her estate proceedings.
The argument that tended to show a lack of intent by Ms. Foxley to
exclude Hogan from the will is that she altered a photocopy of her will
rather than the original.89 If the Nebraska Supreme Court were to
adopt a rule allowing the reading of both the alterations and the al-
tered document, questioning Ms. Foxley's use of a photocopy would be
irrelevant so long as she dated and signed the changes as required by
the holographic will statute. By dating and signing the changes, Ms.
Foxley showed her intent to adopt the alterations as her will. She
probably would not have signed the changes if she did not want them
to be given effect or merely intended them to be notes.
86. See NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-2202 (Reissue 1995).
87. ATKINSON, supra note 1, at 810.
88. See Estate of Foxley v. Hogan, 254 Neb. at 206, 575 N.W.2d at 152.
89. See id.
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Ms. Foxley may have had many reasons for altering the photocopy
instead of the original and our attempts to rationalize this would be
purely speculative. The fact remains that she made many statements
to those close to her regarding her dislike of Hogan at the time she
made the alterations and the signature next to the alterations indi-
cates a desire to give the changes effect.
E. The Unstated Concern that the Absence of Witnesses
Casts Doubt on Whether Ms. Foxley Had Testamentary
Intent When She Made Handwritten Alterations to
Her Attested Will
The problem that the Nebraska Supreme Court had with Ms.
Foxley's changes to her will was, perhaps, the unstated concern that
without a witness to Ms. Foxley's execution of the formalities of the
document, there is less chance that there was testamentary intent.
Witnessed wills may help give a court reasonable certainty that the
instrument was intended as a will, that it was actually executed by
the decedent, and that the testator was free from at least immediate
duress during execution. 90 The Nebraska Legislature has said that
witnesses are not required for a valid holographic will,91 therefore the
inherent certainties associated with a witnessed will might not be
present in a holographic will.
The Nebraska Supreme Court's insistence on looking only at the
handwritten words seems to indicate a suspicion of holographic wills.
Should the court cast doubt on a holographic instrument when there
are no witnesses in light of the fact that the Nebraska Legislature has
said holographic wills are valid even when witnesses are absent?92
Obviously not.
The Nebraska Supreme Court did not explicitly state that the ab-
sence of witnesses was determinative of whether there is testamen-
tary intent,93 but courts in other states have taken great comfort in
recognizing testamentary intent when witnesses are present.9 4 No
90. See, e.g., Estate of Brown v. Nicholas, 218 Cal. Rptr. 108, 110 (Cal. Ct. App.
1985).
91. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2328 (Reissue 1995).
92. See id.
93. See Foxley, 254 Neb. at 207, 575 N.W.2d at 153.
94. See, e.g., Estate of Brown v. Nicholas, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 110; Vickey v. Vickey, 170
So. 745, 746 (Fla. 1936) (noting that a will 'should be presumed to have been
made with testamentary intent when appearing to have been executed within
required legal formalities with necessary witnesses, even though execution as
part of the ceremony of initiating testator into a secret society."); In re Sunday's
Estate, 31 A. 353, 356 (Pa. 1895) ("Testamentary intent is the very breath of life
of a will, and, of course, must be established by two witnesses."); Boyd v. Boyd,
680 S.W.2d 462, 464 (Tenn. 1984) (noting that witnesses may well serve to verify
testamentary intent); Phillips v. Najar, 901 S.W.2d 561, 562 (Tex. App. 1995)
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witnesses means that there was no one present to attest to the formal-
ities of execution. The absence of outside verification does seem to in-
dicate the presence of more uncertainty as to whether an instrument
evidences testamentary intent. But, it certainly is not the place of the
Nebraska Supreme Court to insert its fears where the Legislature has
said there shall be none.
The fact that there were no witnesses present at the time Ms.
Foxley executed the alterations may have played a role in the court's
decision to disregard the language altered by Ms. Foxley.95 Looking
at the language she altered would have shown that the court was not
concerned with whether there were witnesses because she clearly did
not disregard the language in the original will. If it is clear from the
circumstances surrounding her at the time of execution that she in-
tended to exclude Hogan, and the manner in which she made the al-
terations indicates reference to the altered document, then the altered
document should be looked at by the court. It makes little sense to
ignore the altered document unless there is concern about the absence
of witnesses.
F. The Effect of Foxley on Holographs in Nebraska
Estate of Foxley v. Hogan has the practical effect of striking down
any holographic instrument which has too little of its language in the
handwriting of the testator. This will be the result even in a case like
Foxey where the testator's intent is clear. The handwritten portions
of the instrument read in conjunction with any printed words on the
paper and clear from the circumstances surrounding the testator at
the time of the writing clearly show Ms. Foxley's intent.
It is difficult to determine what would be a sufficient amount of
language in the handwriting of the testator to satisfy the Nebraska
Supreme Court, but from the opinion in Foxley, it seems that the
amount needs to be substantial. Unfortunately, the test remains that
if the handwritten words, standing alone, do not make sense and fully
evidence testamentary intent, the holographic instrument is not
valid.96
(finding a valid signature when the testator instructed someone else to affix her
name to her will with a rubber stamp because "she gave the instruction in front of
all witnesses and expressed to them her testamentary intent"); In re Watkins'
Estate, 198 P. 721 (Wash. 1921) (relying on the fact that there were witnesses to
the will who stated that the testator had testamentary intent in signing the will
as a prerequisite to receiving a degree from a secret order during the ceremony of
conferring that degree).
95. See Estate of Foxley v. Hogan, 254 Neb. 204, 207, 575 N.W.2d 150, 153 (1998).
96. See id. at 212, 575 N.W.2d at 155.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Nebraska Supreme Court's narrow construction of the probate
code found in Estate of Foxley v. Hogan represents a step backwards
for Nebraska in the trend toward less formalistic requirements when
determining whether a document is a testamentary instrument. The
court's construction of the code in this case was done in the face of the
code's requirement that it be liberally construed in order to discover
and make effective the intent of the decedent.
If Nebraska were to adopt a position allowing both the handwrit-
ten and printed words to be looked at in a case where someone has
altered his or her attested will, the best consequence would be to give
effect to clear testator intent. Indeed, "[i]f testators are to be en-
couraged by a statute... to draw their own wills, the courts should
not adopt, upon purely technical reasoning, a construction which
would result in invalidating such wills."97
Michael G. Rogers 2000
97. In re Soher's Estate, 21 P. 8, 10 (Cal. 1889).
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